Deleuze does, nevertheless, address the presentation of time-images in an indirect fashion, though quite unlike the manner in which Plato addresses truth indirectly. In other words, Plato too was concerned with attaining a direct image of truth for the understanding, and yet he admitted such a direct knowledge was unattainable; consequently, Plato, by way of Socrates, admits the necessity of analogy, or of approaching the truth through the son of truth, an analogical image of it (see Phaedo, 93b) . Although Deleuze, too, would admit one cannot attain a direct image of the time-image, he would not allow for an analogical presentation of it. The reason for this is that Plato's approach presupposes both the identity of the truth which is to be presented analogically, and the resemblance between this truth and the analogy used to present it. The son looks like the father. The time-image functions quite differently. For
Deleuze the time-image is that fundamental difference which is the passion of thought, or it is the difference which undermines the identities of truth and cannot be thought in its terms, and yet one cannot help but think that which cannot be thought (i.e., the time-image). As the title of Rodowick's essay suggests, the time-image places thought in crisis, or it is the crisis of truth.
Consequently, to present a direct image of time, to present a truth about the time-image, would be contrary to Deleuze's very understanding of the timeimage. Deleuze thus rightly leaves Rodowick's questions unanswered.
As for cinema, Deleuze believes, and several of the writers collected here will agree, that it is well suited for the functionings of the time-image as that which undermines self-identical truths, or instills the effects of time as becoming --whereby becoming subverts and challenges the identity of being. Hence, as Rodowick points out, 'cinema fascinates Deleuze because it is by its very nature anti-Platonic'. The same is true for the author of the second essay, Reda Bensmaia, in her paper titled, 'L''espace quelconque' comme 'personnage conceptuel''. Here the focus is upon Deleuze's use of Pascal Auge's concept 'l'espace quelconque' (any space whatsoever). An 'any space whatsoever' is a space such as a metro stop, a doctor's waiting room, or an airport terminal. It is an anonymous space people pass through, or it is what Deleuze might call a nomadic space, a point of transit between places of 'importance', such as the Film-Philosophy 1.1 1997 metro, which is merely the space one passes through between home and work.
Moreover, in such spaces --and this is what interested the anthropologist Auge --individuals become depersonalized. No one notes or concerns themselves with one another. The place is crowded but everyone is alone. It is for this reason that Auge argued that the 'any space whatsoever' is a homogenous, desingularizing space.
In the hands of Deleuze, as Bensmaia shows, the 'any space whatsoever' plays a much different role. Bensmaia shows that the 'any space whatsoever' functions in Deleuze's theory much as the conceptual personae ('personnage conceptuel') do. That is, as Deleuze and Guattari argue in What is Philosophy?, philosophers, artists, and scientists each, in their own way, attempt to establish a sense of order to a fundamentally chaotic and forever changing world. They attempt to create a 'chaosmos'. However, for Deleuze and Guattari, to do this requires a mediating factor, or something that is neither chaos nor the strict identity of concepts (for the philosopher), affects (for the artist), or representations (for the scientist). This mediating factor is the condition for the possibility of such an identity, and for the philosopher it is the 'conceptual personnae'. In other words, just as the 'any space whatsoever' mediates, or is the point of transit between two established spaces (e.g., home and work), so too the conceptual personnae mediates between chaos and the order created out of this chaos. In contrast to Auge, therefore, rather than being an homogenizing and de-singularizing force, Bensmaia shows that for Deleuze the 'any space whatsoever' is a condition for the emergence of uniqueness and singularities.
In the context of cinema, Deleuze observes that frequent use is made of the 'any space whatsoever'. For example, Chris Marker uses airport terminals, public buildings, etc., as a means of undermining certain presuppositions one might have regarding the identity of character, plot, etc. Similarly, Antonioni's use of desert landscapes does much the same thing; in short, the 'any space whatsoever' functions in much the same manner that the time-image does: it places the identity of character, plot, etc., into crisis. A favorite example of Deleuze's is Bresson's film Pickpocket. In this film the pickpocket haunts the public 'any space whatsoever'. He preys upon people who are in transit.
Film-Philosophy 1.1 However, for Deleuze, the significance of this use of the 'any space whatsoever' is to emphasize the undetermined moral nature of the pickpocket. The pickpocket is not predetermined to be evil, but rather he must constitute himself as such each and every time he steals; and, for Deleuze, it is the 'any space whatsoever' which is the condition for the possibility of constituting an identity, or for questioning one's identity (which is what occurs in Pickpocket). 
The next couple essays in

